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Abstract
There are three broad sets of qualities that citizens might expect politicians to display: competence, 
integrity and authenticity. To be authentic, a politician must be judged to be in touch with the lives 
and outlooks of ordinary people and previous research has suggested that this expectation has 
grown more prevalent in recent times. In this article, we use survey evidence from Britain – from 
citizens, parliamentarians and journalists – to explore which groups are prone to judge politicians 
by which criteria. While all groups give the highest absolute importance to integrity traits, we 
establish that distrusting citizens are significantly more likely to prioritise authenticity. For political 
elites and journalists, we find indications that authenticity is less valued than among citizens: 
politicians place more relative importance on integrity traits while journalists value competence 
most. We reflect on these findings and how they help us understand the growing crisis afflicting 
British politics.
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Introduction
The personality and qualities of political leaders has long been acknowledged as an 
important element of politics and influence on political attitudes and behaviour (Declercq 
et al., 1975; Laswell, 1930; Regenstrei, 1965). In more recent decades, academic atten-
tion has turned towards how the expectations that citizens have of politicians determine 
these important dynamics (Garzia, 2011; Pancer et al., 1999). This increasing attention 
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has been accompanied by the argument that these expectations and evaluations have 
become even more important over time, as partisanship in the electorate has declined 
dramatically (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Mair and Van Biezen, 2001). Citizens are 
less tied by loyalty to a party or candidate and thus might be more engaged in a process 
of judgement about who to lend their support to at each election (Dalton, 1984, 2009). 
The dynamics of interaction between politicians and citizens have also changed as media 
technology develops rapidly and party organisations shift, fundamentally reshaping our 
political landscapes (Garzia, 2011; McAllister, 2007; Manin, 1997). These new spaces for 
interaction can support a greater focus by citizens on the personal qualities of the leader.
In this study, we explore the structure of citizens’ expectations towards politicians’ per-
sonality traits and the relationship between these expectations and political trust, using a 
2018 representative sample of British adults. We compare these with the results of a small-N 
survey conducted among political elites in the UK in 2017 to examine whether expectations 
are consistent between citizens and elites. We open the article with a focus on three traits: 
competence, integrity and authenticity. The first two categories are widely understood and 
used. The same cannot be said for the third. We clarify the scope of authenticity and note the 
evidence that it may be becoming an increasingly important criterion by which citizens judge 
politicians. In the second section, we explore the potential connections between political trust 
and authenticity. After outlining our research strategy, we present our findings. The conclud-
ing discussion explores the implications of our findings given the extensive lack of political 
trust and confidence that has characterised the attitudes of British citizens for at least the past 
decade (Clarke et al., 2018; Stoker, 2017; Whiteley et al., 2016).
The Qualities of Political Leaders: Competence, Integrity 
and Authenticity
There has been some variability in the findings and terminology of previous studies on 
the personal traits of politicians: while most of these find two distinct dimensions relating 
to competence on one hand and integrity on the other, there is less consistency on other 
potential dimensions (Brown et al., 1998; Garzia, 2011; Miller et al., 1986). A third 
dimension has been called ‘charisma’, described as the ability of leaders to persuade vot-
ers, but also sometimes including traits such as warmth and humility (Miller et al., 1986; 
Seijts et al., 2015). Relatedly, there is emerging evidence that it has become more impor-
tant to citizens in recent decades that politicians appear more ‘human’ to them (Clarke 
et al., 2018; Garzia, 2011). As Clarke et al. (2018: 208) describe it:
The expectation that politicians be ‘human’ appears to have developed from a relatively minor 
and undemanding expectation that politicians be genial, warm, and sympathetic to a relatively 
major and more demanding expectation that politicians be ‘normal’ in a variety of ways and 
situations and especially ‘in touch’ with the ‘real’ lives of ‘ordinary’ people.
These authors found that citizens’ anti-political sentiment has been rising steadily in 
the UK and that this has gone together with changing expectations of politicians: while 
citizens have always associated ‘The Good Politician’ with personality traits related to 
integrity and competence, there is a growing expectation that politicians should also be 
more ‘human’, ‘normal’ or ‘in touch’ with ordinary people: to be more authentic. Charisma 
is a term better reserved for when exceptional qualities of vision, veracity and trustwor-
thiness are perceived in a leader by followers (Conger and Kanungo, 1987; Willner, 
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1984). Moreover, there is an important distinction between the trait of being able to per-
suade people on issues and being perceived as likable and like them. Indeed, it has been 
argued for a long time that with the advent of television and the rise of post-materialist 
values (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), citizens have begun to place more 
importance on politicians appearing to be likable and similar to them, on the same level 
rather than above them (Garzia, 2011; Meyrowitz, 1985; Rahn et al., 1990).
The concept of ‘authenticity’ has a long and complex history within diverse academic 
fields: from the ancient Greek philosophers’ preoccupation with the importance of know-
ing ourselves and expressing our true selves in life, through the existentialist writings of 
philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault about the difficulty of discov-
ering and creating oneself (Daigle, 2017; Sutton, 2020), through studies in economics, 
gastronomy, music, nursing, tourism and various other fields of society (Catalano, 2000; 
Newman, 2019). In more recent times, studies in psychology and management have 
largely converged on three types of authenticity: historical consistency (having an authen-
tic connection to a prior time/entity as claimed; e.g. an authentic Picasso), categorical 
conformity (conforming to the norms of a category as socially construed; e.g. authentic 
Italian food) and value consistency (the true external expression of an individual’s or 
society’s internal values; e.g. authentic artist) (Wood et al., 2008). It is this third category 
which is of most relevance to our discussion (and arguably to earlier philosophical treat-
ments): individuals being true to their internal values in their expression, living in accord-
ance with their inner selves rather than in line with external pressures and contexts. More 
specifically, we might think of authentic politicians as those who act genuinely like their 
true selves and like normal people, rather than in accordance with what is convenient and 
expected of them by the political context and by external pressures such as the media, 
campaign experts and political strategy. This trait has received little attention in empirical 
research in political science, however (Stiers et al., 2019).
To distinguish authenticity from integrity (associated with honesty, being true to prin-
ciples, keeping promises) and competence (associated with skill, effectiveness, getting 
things done) it would seem appropriate to focus on the human dimension – on whether 
politicians are seen as in touch with ordinary people, accepting of themselves and others 
and able to understand everyday life. Do they engage with popular culture? Do they know 
how others live? Do they react with shared humour to situations? These qualities are not 
necessarily easy to find in elected representatives, in part, as Allen and Cutts (2018: 79) 
argue, because having the ambition to be a politician marks someone out: ‘people who 
run for political office are strange, that is, they are unusual, abnormal, unlike most other 
people’. The pertinent differences extend beyond gender and class to personality features, 
where prospective politicians are more confident, more open to new challenges and more 
contented with disagreement and conflict. These personality features might comfortably 
go along with the performance of competence and even integrity, but they might not be 
the easiest starting point for showing authenticity. Yet authenticity may be a virtue that 
politicians increasingly need to demonstrate, in part as a response to rising distrust in 
politics. This issue is explored in the following section.
The Drivers of Political Trust: Process, Performance and 
Authenticity
Making trust judgements about politics and government is a demanding task. It is not 
surprising therefore that Whiteley et al. (2016) find considerable volatility in the public’s 
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assessment of the trustworthiness of British governments, notwithstanding an over-arch-
ing trend of decline in levels of trust since the 1990s. A new government or a change of 
government personnel can get an uplift in trust and then if a failure of process or perfor-
mance becomes prominent (as, for example, in the case of the 2003 Iraq War) a loss of 
trust can be triggered and subsequently sustained. The public is trying to make trust 
judgements in a context of low information and uncertainty.
The challenge for citizens becomes clearer once it is recognised, following Hardin 
(2006), that trustworthiness is not about the moral standing of the actor or institution that 
is trusted or not. In what he calls ‘an encapsulated interest account’ the assumption is that 
trustworthiness is driven by a sense on the part of the citizen that the politician or govern-
ment agency (the focus of their trust) has their interests at heart and will take them into 
account in their decisions. To establish trustworthiness, the citizen asks: Does the politi-
cian or government want to take our interests or welfare into account in their actions?
Trust judgements do not require perfect or even a great deal of information to be 
obtained by the citizen. Cues, hints, scraps of insight can be enough. Indeed, this caveat 
makes the possibility of political trust achievable rather than some utopian ideal. At the 
same time, however, errors of judgements may be common, either lacking trust in trust-
worthy agents, or expressing trust in agents who fail to act in the best interests of their 
citizens. One common shortcut used by citizens is to focus on individuals rather than 
institutions. Whiteley et al. (2016: 238) found that in their study ‘evaluations of the Prime 
Minister of the day are likely to provide a powerful and easily used heuristic for determin-
ing whether the government can be trusted’. Citizens may be more comfortable about 
judging an individual politician rather than a government, since those are the criteria that 
they tend to use in much of their everyday lives.
The two ‘classic’ frames that citizens use to make trust judgements are focused on the 
processes used by governments to reach decisions and the performance or outcomes that 
they achieve. These two forms of judgement connect, respectively, to integrity and com-
petence values associated with political figures. In making judgements it would be rea-
sonable if these two forms of assessment for citizens were to a degree connected: if you 
get what you want in terms of outcomes it might increase your tendency to see the process 
as fair (Verba, 2006).
The process argument rests on the idea that if government treats people fairly when 
it makes decisions, then that is more likely to build political trust (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse, 2001). But demonstrating fairness is by no means an easy task. It could be 
established by a government agency through giving people the information they need, 
sharing facts and developments, being accessible and giving appropriate feedback. The 
issue is not whether that is done, but if it is perceived to be done. As Carman (2010: 
747) comments, process ‘matters for public evaluations of political institutions. 
Procedural justice scholars have demonstrated that in several contexts individuals’ 
assessments of how ‘fair’ they believe a process to be will influence their willingness to 
accept outcomes’. But in most of these analyses the citizen has some form of direct 
engagement with the decision. An extension of this argument is that giving citizens a 
say in decision-making more directly through various forms of democratic innovation 
(participatory budgeting, citizens’ juries, citizen polls) might also increase trust (Fishkin 
and Mansbridge, 2017; Geissel and Newton, 2012; Smith, 2009), but with the important 
caveat that these forms of engagement must be seen as fair (Carman, 2010). Again, to 
make a trust judgement in these cases involves citizens having some direct engagement 
with a democratic innovation.
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Making a performance judgement is also challenging for citizens. As Whiteley et al. 
(2016: 237) argue: ‘(b)y implication a good performance should increase trust in govern-
ment, since it implies that parties are successfully delivering on their promises’. But they 
go on and note how evaluations are often ‘not so much on what is delivered, but rather on 
who is delivering it’. Citizens ‘will opt for a “safe pair of hands” or a leader they think is 
competent and trustworthy and avoid a leader who they think is not up to the job’. 
Perception is, again, the key issue. And this in turn will be influenced by the partisan posi-
tion of the assessor; if the party you voted for is in power, you are more likely to trust it 
to perform. Green and Jennings (2017) show how political parties come to gain or lose 
‘ownership’ of issues, how they are judged on their performance in government across 
policy issues, and how they develop a reputation for competence (or incompetence) over 
a period in office. Their analysis tracks the major events causing people to reevaluate 
party reputations, and the costs of governing which cause electorates to punish parties in 
power. The challenge is that generally voters seem to be not very attentive to politics, and 
when it comes to retrospective judgement about the performance of government, they 
may lack the capacity to effectively allocate credit or blame to political leaders. Insofar as 
they do judge, those judgements are often quite myopic, based on the past few months 
before an election (Achen and Bartels, 2016).
Both process and performance evaluations demand from citizens considerable effort 
and engagement with politics and practices. In the absence of that effort, shortcuts of vari-
ous types make trust judgements more likely to be less definitive, more partial, and epi-
phenomenal. But is there another option for the trust seeking citizen? Grimmelikhuijsen 
and Knies (2017), drawing upon an extensive body of studies of trust in public and private 
sector organisations, suggest three components of trust by citizens. Two are the now 
familiar competency and integrity aspects but a third is defined as perceived benevolence: 
the extent to which a citizen perceives the agent to care about their welfare and to be 
motivated to act in the public interest. There is a connection here to the earlier discussion 
of authenticity, defined as the capacity to be perceived to understand the concerns of citi-
zens and share an understanding of their everyday lives. Again, as Hardin’s (2006) defini-
tion suggests, the issue of trustworthiness is about judging whether someone has your 
interests at heart. The perceived authenticity of a political actor could be a reasonable 
proxy for such a judgement. When searching for relevant insights to make trust judge-
ments, subject to limited time and effort, citizens may well turn to considerations of the 
authenticity of political actors, alongside their competence and integrity.
Research Design
The research design of our study rests on two surveys: one directed at citizens and one at 
political elites. The nationally representative survey of 1881 citizens was conducted by 
Sky Data (a member of the British Polling Council) between 20 and 30 October 2017. 
The survey of political elites was conducted by the authors, distributed to over a thousand 
politicians and journalists between 4 and 20 December 2017. Prior research finds that 
response rates for surveys of political elites are low and probably falling, in part because 
of time constraints on respondents, the status of such studies and because researchers 
have to typically make first contact instead of going through a survey organisation (Bailer, 
2014; Walgrave and Joly, 2018). To collect responses, we compiled email addresses for 
650 MPs at Westminster, 338 Lords, 73 MEPs, 129 Members of the Scottish Parliament, 
58 Assembly Members in Wales, 83 Members of the Legislative Assembly in Northern 
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Ireland and 330 journalists. We sent invitations and two reminders to each of these and 
managed to get 61 responses – 47 from representatives and 14 from journalists. In line 
with prior surveys of elites, this is not a high response rate or a large enough sample to 
draw statistical inferences about either the population of representatives or journalists, 
but the responses do give an interesting insight into the priorities of the elites who 
responded to the survey, and a valuable comparison with citizen responses. Details of the 
coverage of the two surveys are provided in the online supplementary material.
In both surveys, respondents were presented with 21 items derived from previous 
research, indicating potential characteristics/traits of a good politician (Clarke et al., 
2018) – such as ‘is principled’, ‘works hard’ and ‘has had a proper job outside politics’. 
We asked: ‘Where 1 is least important and 10 is most important, how important are each 
of the following to making a good politician?’ and then listed the 21 different traits (the 
full list is reported in the online supplementary material). These scales are the basis of the 
dependent variables of the first part of our analysis but, as shown in the following section, 
the mean scores of these variables were highly clustered towards the top of the scale with 
little discriminating power between them. To disentangle this for statistical analyses, we 
create new variables of ‘relative importance’: the difference between the score each 
respondent gives to each item and the average score that respondent gave to all items, to 
indicate the relative priority placed by respondents on each trait. Based on these relative 
measures, we conduct principal-component factor analysis and reliability analysis to cre-
ate three combined scales from the underlying patterns in the prioritisation scoring of 
these various items: scales for integrity, competence and authenticity.
In the citizen survey, we also asked various questions about trust and confidence in 
politics and government, mostly based on questions commonly used by researchers in the 
field of political support. These included a question asking, ‘How confident are you in the 
ability of the UK government to address . . . ’ (on a 5-point scale where 1 was ‘not at all’, 
and 5 was ‘very’) a range of (11) issues, with topics ranging from immigration to educa-
tion and the environment. They also included several questions about attitudes to politics 
and politicians: ‘How much do you personally trust the UK government?’ (5-point scale 
from ‘do not trust them at all’ to ‘trust them very much’); ‘Do you think that British politi-
cians are out merely for themselves, for their party, or to do their best for their country?’; 
‘Do you think that the standards of honesty and integrity of elected politicians in the UK 
have been improving in recent years, have been declining, or have they stayed about the 
same?’ and ‘In general, do you feel that the people in government are too often interested 
in looking after themselves, or do you feel that they can be trusted to do the right thing 
nearly all the time?’ (more details on these questions and response options are presented 
in the online supplementary material).
In the analysis, we use these questions to fashion more parsimonious variables indicat-
ing political (dis)trust: one variable for the mean confidence respondents have in the UK 
government across the 11 policy issues, one binary variable for those who indicate dis-
trust in the UK government, one binary variable for those who think that British politi-
cians are out for themselves (as opposed to their party or country), one for those who 
think that politicians’ standards have been declining in recent years and one for those who 
feel that the people in government are usually or sometimes out for themselves. We again 
use factor and reliability analyses to create a single scale of political distrust for these 
measures. In the case of both this scale and the personality trait scales, we weight each 
measure in the combined scale according to their loadings on the underlying factors, 
instead of simply summing them indiscriminately as a raw alpha-based scale would (see 
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Boermans and Kattenberg, 2012).1 To examine the relationships between these scales, 
background variables and vote in the 2017 general election and 2016 referendum, we use 
multivariate regression models. Finally, we present a descriptive exploration of the views 
of the elite respondents, comparing them with the views of citizens.
Results
The presentation of our results is divided into three parts. First, we analyse citizens’ 
judgement of what makes for a good politician. Second, we compare this judgement with 
that of political elites. Finally, we explore the relationship between trust in politics and 
citizens’ expectations regarding the good politician.
Who Wants What From Politicians? The View of Citizens
Figure 1 presents the average importance score that citizen respondents gave to each 
listed trait of a good politician. These average scores are highly clustered towards the 
upper end of the scale (most traits score higher than 7 out of 10), as noted previously. 
Nonetheless, respondents ascribed the least importance to the ‘traits’ (or characteristics) 
of politicians dressing well and being presentable in terms of looks and voice, while the 
four highest rated traits are broad personality traits that all appear to relate to integrity: 
being honest, trustworthy and genuine and meaning what you say. Traits related to com-
petence also seem rather highly valued (e.g. working hard, being level-headed, wise and 
strong) and the same goes for a few traits related to the ‘authenticity’ of politicians: espe-
cially those of understanding everyday life and being in touch with ordinary people.
To move from these descriptive summaries to statistical analysis, we start by eliminat-
ing the overall upward bias and clustering of the scoring for these traits, as well as the 
Figure 1. Citizens – Average Importance-Grade of All Traits for the Entire Sample (1881 
Respondents).
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potentially biasing (in this context) effect of respondents using overall mental scales dif-
ferently from one another. We do so by creating variables for each item that indicate how 
each respondent rated it compared with the average score they gave to all items (simply, 
subtracting this average from the score for each item). While this conceals the fact that 
some respondents generally rate traits lower, it focuses on the relative importance or pri-
oritisation of politicians’ traits for each respondent, which we are examining here.
We then run a principal-component factor analysis of these 21 transformed variables, 
with promax rotation (which allows factors to be correlated in order to approximate sim-
ple structure) to explore the dimensional structure of these different expectations (Table 
1). We explored the data running factor analyses allowing for three, four, five and six 
factors in turn – all of these resulted in three major factors which substantively seem to 
reflect the three underlying trait dimensions suggested by our theory. These are all pre-
sented in the online supplementary material, but here we present and proceed on the basis 
of the five-factor structure which resulted in the most theoretically straightforward factor 
structure (the other versions, while indicating the same underlying dimensions, had over-
laps between factor loadings which would cause undesirable multicollinearity between 
factors in our analysis). The results of this factor analysis are presented in Table 1, dis-
playing all factor loadings above 0.3. These indicate that there are indeed three dominant 
dimensions in respondents’ expectations of politicians’ traits: at least six variables load 
onto each of those factors and their lowest eigenvalue is over 2, while only three variables 
Table 1. Principal-Component Factor Analysis of 21 Measures of the Relative Importance of 
Politicians’ Personality Traits, Promax Rotation With Five Factors.
Traits Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Eigenvalue 4.44 3.24 2.34 1.38 1.25
Sincere 0.53  
Trustworthy 0.76  
Honest 0.68  
Means what they say 0.64  
Genuine 0.66  
Principled 0.59  
In touch with ordinary people 0.74  
Understands everyday life 0.64  
Comfortable with most people −0.45 0.46  
Presentable looks and voice −0.51 −0.42  
Dresses well −0.51 −0.34  
Clever −0.50 0.43  
Works Hard 0.38  
Wise 0.74  
Level-headed 0.64  
Warm −0.47 0.37 −0.37
Inspiring 0.58  
Has Personality −0.34  
Good on the international stage 0.50
Strong 0.77
Has had a proper job outside politics −0.48 −0.74  
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(which partly overlap with the other factors) explain each of the other factors and their 
eigenvalues are close to 1. In line with previous findings (Miller et al., 1986; Pancer et al., 
1999), two of these factors seem to rather clearly reflect the underlying traits of integrity 
(being sincere, trustworthy, honest, genuine, principled and meaning what they say) and 
competence (being wise, level-headed, clever and working hard). The third dominant fac-
tor seems to clearly capture the ‘authenticity’ element noted in previous studies (Clarke 
et al., 2018; Garzia, 2011): understanding everyday life, being in touch with ordinary 
people and being comfortable with most people. Also note that in this factor, politicians’ 
cleverness, looks, voice and clothes are perceived as less important; prioritising these 
traits has a negative loading on this dimension. The fourth and fifth factors seem to reflect 
traits which may be partially distinct but also overlap with the other factors both empiri-
cally and theoretically. Since they account for a much smaller part of the overall variation 
in response, we focus on the three dominant factors in our empirical analysis for 
parsimony.
To create combined scales reflecting respondents’ different emphases on these differ-
ent underlying traits, we combine the measures loading onto each respective factor, 
weighing them according to their heterogeneous contributions to that factor (multiplying 
their scores by their loadings on that factor) (see also Boermans and Kattenberg, 2012) 
and run reliability analysis of the scales created from these weighted variables. The results 
indicate a high reliability for the first factor, integrity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78), and the 
second factor, authenticity (alpha = 0.65). Removing the measures of being ‘clever’ and 
‘comfortable with most people’ improved the score of the authenticity scale to alpha = 0.74. 
This suggests that while the underlying trait measured by these different variables is sub-
stantively related to an emphasis on politicians being comfortable with most people, and 
a lack of emphasis on them being clever, these measures deviate more from measuring 
that underlying trait than the other measures do (likely because there are other underlying 
traits that are also related to that measure). Therefore, we do not include these two vari-
ables in the scalar measure but will remain aware that this scale also relates to those two 
traits.2 The third factor, competence, had a significantly lower reliability score 
(alpha = 0.30), but we retain that scale since those measures all load onto the same factor, 
removing any of them would not improve the reliability of the scale and this factor is a 
theoretically important one (as confirmed by prior studies).
Looking at the varying importance placed on these different underlying traits by 
groups of citizens, Table 2 presents the regression models of each scale on gender, age, 
vote in the 2016 EU referendum and vote in the 2017 general election (with voting for 
remaining in the EU and for the Conservative Party as the reference categories). Looking 
at model 1, we see that the coefficient for gender is moderately significant (at the 95% 
confidence level): men appear to be slightly more likely to prioritise integrity traits, rela-
tive to other traits, than women. The same applies to 2017 Labour voters (when control-
ling for age, gender and referendum vote), who are more likely to prioritise integrity than 
those who voted for the Conservatives. Looking at model 2, older voters are slightly less 
likely to prioritise authenticity traits than younger voters but the strongest effects we find 
in these models are the partisan differences on this variable: Labour voters are substan-
tially more likely to prioritise authenticity than Conservative voters, as are respondents 
who voted for other parties and those who did not vote. In model 3, we see that older 
voters are also less likely to prioritise competence and the same applies for Leave voters. 
Figure 2 plots the coefficients and their associated confidence intervals from these 
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models, illustrating that the starkest dynamics appear to be the varying priority placed on 
authenticity by different groups of voters.
Elites in Touch but With Different Priorities
Turning to a descriptive exploration of the relative importance attributed to each scale in 
the small-N survey of political elites (61 respondents from a group of MPs, Lords, MEPs, 
members of devolved legislatures and journalists), Figure 3 compares the average scores 
given by citizens and elites to the personality traits used to create the scales in this analy-
sis (in descending order within each group). It appears that citizens generally give higher 
scores to almost all traits, but it is difficult to parse out any systematic differences. The 
overall ordering seems to be similar but it is notable that the trait of understanding every-
day life appears to be given much higher priority by citizens than elites, and this is indeed 
one of the traits that made up the authenticity scale in the citizen survey. Figure 4 disen-
tangles this by graphing the average scores given to the items within each scale by citi-
zens and elites – divided into political representatives (elected MPs, MEPs and members 
Table 2. Regression Models on Personality Trait Scales by Gender, Age, EU Referendum Vote 
and Party Vote in 2017.
(1) (2) (3)
 Integrity Authenticity Competence
Male 0.078* 0.014 0.013
 (0.032) (0.054) (0.030)
Age −0.000 −0.004* −0.003***
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age2 −0.000 0.000 0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EU referendum vote: Leave −0.023 0.050 −0.064*
 (0.035) (0.067) (0.031)
Vote 2017: Labour 0.102* 0.328*** −0.028
 (0.041) (0.071) (0.036)
Vote 2017: Lib Dems. 0.163 0.182 0.110
 (0.095) (0.108) (0.088)
Vote 2017: UKIP −0.016 0.170 −0.010
 (0.058) (0.107) (0.060)
Vote 2017: Other 0.054 0.368** −0.077
 (0.074) (0.117) (0.064)
Vote 2017: Did not vote 0.113 0.349*** −0.050
 (0.060) (0.104) (0.053)
Constant 0.493*** 0.894*** 0.318***
 (0.072) (0.114) (0.061)
Observations 1784 1784 1784
R-squared 0.024 0.065 0.032
Log likelihood −1159.548 −2005.508 −901.642
EU: European Union; UKIP: UK Independence Party.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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of devolved assemblies as well as unelected peers) and political journalists. Here, we see 
clear indications that authenticity is most valued by citizens, while integrity is most val-
ued by representatives and competence most valued by journalists.
Figure 2. Coefficient Plots of Three Dimensions of Important Politicians’ Traits, by Gender, 
Age, EU Referendum Vote and Party Vote in 2017.
Figure 3. Citizens and Elites: Average Scores Given to Personality Traits, Compared Between 
a Representative Survey of Citizens and a Small-N Survey of Elites.
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Calculating the same scales for the elite respondents (using the factor loadings from 
the citizen survey as weights), Figure 5 compares the average score on these scales by 
three groups: 1881 respondents from the citizen survey, 47 elected representatives from 
the elite survey and 14 journalists from the latter. Since these scales are partly based on 
factor loadings which differ between scales, these scores are comparable within scales but 
not between them (i.e. as we show above, citizens place more absolute importance on 
integrity than on authenticity). Comparing each scale between groups, we see further 
indication that citizens do indeed place the most relative importance on authenticity traits, 
more than the representatives and substantially more than the journalists from the elite 
survey, while the representatives prioritise integrity more and journalists place the highest 
relative importance on competence, by some margin.
Political Distrust and the Good Politician
In the first section of this analysis, we saw that when citizens rate the importance of dif-
ferent traits in making a good politician, there appear to be three major underlying traits 
that explain the relative priorities that they place on different traits: competence, integrity 
and authenticity. In the previous section, we then saw indications that citizens may place 
more priority on authenticity traits than political elites, while political representatives 
appear to place more priority on integrity traits and political journalists on competence. 
In this section, we turn to examining if and how these different traits are related to meas-
ures of political (dis)trust in the citizen survey. Starting with the different measures of 
trust available in the Sky Data survey, we have harmonised the variables so that all vari-
ables are made binary, where 1 indicates distrust and 0 indicates trust, except the measure 
of confidence in government; this is an average of 11 measures on a scale between 1 and 
5, where higher values indicate more confidence. Table 3 presents a matrix of the 
Figure 4. Traits by Scale: Average Scores Given to Personality Traits Within Each Scale, 
Compared Between a Representative Survey of Citizens and a Small-N Survey of Elites.
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Pearson’s R correlation between these different measures (detailed in the online supple-
mentary material), showing moderate-to-high correlations between all measures. A con-
firmatory principal-component factor analysis revealed that all measures indeed load 
significantly and substantially onto a single, underlying factor which presumably reflects 
respondents’ overall political trust. The loadings of each measure on this common factor 
are presented in the final column of Table 3.
Applying the same scaling method as before, weighting the variables by their factor 
loadings, results in a scale which has a high alpha value of 0.72. This value would be lower 
if we dropped any of the variables, indicating that together they form a reliable scale which 
Figure 5. Average Scores on the Relative Importance Attribution of Each Personality 
Dimension, by Groups of Respondents.
Table 3. Correlations Between Measures of Political Trust in the Citizen Survey and Their 
Factor Loadings From a Principal-Component Factor Analysis, Resulting in a Single Dominant 
Factor.
Pearson’s R Confidence Distrust Themselves Self-
interested
Factor 
loadings
Confidence in UK Government
(average of 11 issues)
1 −0.738
Distrust UK  
Government
−0.564 1 0.763
Politicians out for  
themselves
−0.277 0.306 1 0.631
People in government too 
interested in looking out for 
themselves
−0.400 0.432 0.4267 1 0.753
Politicians’ standards declining −0.349 0.365 0.322 0.400 0.673
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measures respondents’ political distrust. Table 4 presents regression analyses of these 
measures and the composite distrust scale on gender, age, Leave vote in the 2016 referen-
dum and party vote in the 2017 general election. Note that models 1 and 6 are linear regres-
sion models and the rest (models 2 to 4) are logistic,3 and that the average of confidence 
measures is the only one relating to trust (or ‘confidence’) rather than lack of trust.
From the models and coefficients presented in Table 4, it is clear that party vote has a 
strong relationship with all of these measures, while other predictors show few and weak 
relationships. This is hardly surprising: it is well known that identifying with a governing 
party has a positive effect on political support (e.g. Blais and Gélineau, 2007; Citrin, 
1974; Marien, 2011). The Conservative Party was the party in office when the survey was 
conducted and voters of other parties all show significantly lower trust on almost all 
measures. In model 1, we see that the coefficient for voting Leave is moderately signifi-
cant; when controlling for other factors (including 2017 vote), Leave voters actually have 
slightly more confidence in the government to address various issues. Conversely, in 
models 3 and 4 we see that this coefficient is positive: Leave voters are more likely to 
think that British politicians are ‘out merely for themselves’ and that people in 
Table 4. Regression Analyses of the Political Distrust Scale and Its Five Component Measures 
on Gender, Age, EU Referendum Vote and Party Vote in 2017.
Confidence Distrust Themselves Self-
interested
Confidence Distrust 
Scale
Male 0.042 −0.058 −0.114 0.162 −0.136 −0.003
 (0.056) (0.169) (0.164) (0.172) (0.156) (0.019)
Age 0.000 −0.018** −0.009 −0.015** 0.002 −0.001
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001)
Age2 0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EU referendum 
vote: Leave 
0.154*
(0.061)
−0.100
(0.196)
0.562**
(0.187)
0.607**
(0.200)
−0.017
(0.175)
0.012
(0.022)
2017 vote: 
Labour 
−0.787***
(0.064)
1.784***
(0.215)
0.646*** 1.209*** 0.815*** 0.267***
(0.195) (0.212) (0.189) (0.023)
2017 vote: Lib 
Dems 
−0.482*** 1.580*** 1.039** 0.428 −0.312 0.163***
(0.125) (0.369) (0.351) (0.391) (0.338) (0.044)
2017 vote: UKIP −0.759*** 1.621*** 1.488** 1.539*** 1.397*** 0.289***
 (0.121) (0.390) (0.518) (0.425) (0.399) (0.040)
2017 vote: 
Other 
−0.897*** 3.143*** 0.794 1.483** 0.989** 0.317***
(0.116) (0.401) (0.423) (0.557) (0.373) (0.043)
2017 vote:
Did not vote 
−0.603*** 1.874*** 0.706 1.833*** 0.885** 0.236***
(0.123) (0.285) (0.379) (0.343) (0.326) (0.036)
Constant 2.758*** 0.304 0.181 0.661 −0.291 −0.133**
 (0.111) (0.363) (0.343) (0.351) (0.330) (0.041)
Observations 1784 1784 1634 1784 1710 1784
Pseudo 
R-squared 0.230 0.185 0.033 0.089 0.039 0.217
Log likelihood −1987.347 −977.282 −1072.939 −971.096 −1106.111 −100.963
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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government are ‘too often interested in looking after themselves’. From models 2 and 4, 
it also appears that older voters are less likely to distrust the UK government and to think 
they are too interested in looking after themselves. Figure 6 plots the coefficients from 
these models and their associated confidence intervals, illustrating that gender and age are 
rarely significant (their confidence intervals cross the light-grey line indicating no effect) 
but that 2017 vote has strong effects in almost all instances.
Turning back to the dimensions of the good politician, Table 5 estimates regression mod-
els for each dimension on the distrust scale, in addition to the demographic and political 
controls. Some interesting relationships are evident. Controlling for party preference, there 
is a strong positive relationship between political distrust and placing higher importance on 
politicians’ authenticity, and a weak but significant negative relationship between distrust 
and the competence trait. Labour voters and non-voters are also significantly more likely to 
value authenticity more highly relative to other traits, controlling for their age and political 
distrust. These electoral dynamics of expectations of the good politician are illustrated with 
a coefficient plot in Figure 7, where the strong relationship between political distrust and 
prioritising the authenticity trait stands out. It is also interesting to note that including politi-
cal distrust in these models substantially weakens the variation between voter groups found 
earlier in Table 2 and Figure 2; the only effect remaining is a mildly significant effect of 
voting for Labour. This indicates that the higher propensity of those who prioritise authen-
ticity to vote for Labour, another party or not at all (as opposed to voting for the Conservatives) 
in 2017 was closely related to their higher levels of political distrust.
Discussion
We have analysed results from two surveys conducted in 2017: a nationally representative 
survey of the British public; and a small-N survey of political elites. These surveys 
focused on what characteristics or traits make for a good politician. Is it integrity, compe-
tence or authenticity that is most important? The citizen survey also focused on political 
distrust, allowing analysis of the relationship between distrust and expectations of the 
good politician. The analysis generated three main sets of findings. First, the traits 
regarded as important for the good politician varied by demographic and political charac-
teristics of citizens. Younger people, Labour voters, and non-voters place more value on 
authenticity. Older people and men tend to place more value on integrity. Younger people 
and Remainers place more value on competence. Second, there are indications that citi-
zens might place more value on authenticity than elites. Within our small-N sample of 
elites, political representatives tended to place more value on integrity and journalists 
more on competence. While our sample is too small to be considered representative, this 
finding provides indications which warrant further research on the topic. Third, citizens 
who place a high value on authenticity are more likely to express political distrust, while 
citizens who place a high value on competence are less likely to express political 
distrust.
In the rest of this final section, we discuss the second and third main sets of findings. 
They correspond to different parts of what we might call an ‘authenticity gap’. There are 
indications of a gap between the extent to which authenticity is emphasised as an impor-
tant trait by citizens and political elites. Citizens appear to place more value on authentic-
ity than do elites. This could be linked to a desire of voters for representatives who share 
their social background (Heath, 2018). Furthermore, citizens who value authenticity 
highly are more likely to distrust politicians and the politics they represent. This suggests 
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there is also a gap between the expectations that citizens have of authentic politicians and 
the inauthentic politicians they perceive to be offered by parties. What remains for discus-
sion is the question of why these two parts of the authenticity gap might exist.
The gap between what citizens expect of politicians and what political elites expect of 
themselves makes sense in the context of existing research comparing understandings of 
good political behaviour. Allen and Birch (2015) found that understandings of political 
ethics vary between politicians and citizens. While the former tend to focus relatively 
narrowly on the financial conflicts of interest covered by institutional rules and codes, the 
focus of the latter is usually much broader and covers ‘discursive integrity’ – keeping 
promises and not giving evasive answers – in addition to financial integrity.
The research of Allen and Birch connects to a second point on the expectations gap 
between citizens and politicians. It is often said that generals always fight the last war, or 
politicians always fight the last political battle. For Allen and Birch, the last battle between 
voters and political elites in Britain was centred on the issue of politicians’ integrity. 
There had been the period of ‘Tory sleaze’ in the early 1990s, followed by the MPs’ 
Table 5. Regression Analyses of Political Trait Scales on the Political Distrust Scale, Gender, 
Age, EU Referendum Vote and Party Vote in 2017.
(1) (2) (3)
 Integrity Authenticity Competence
Distrust Scale 0.094 0.501*** −0.140*
 (0.060) (0.128) (0.057)
Male 0.078* 0.015 0.012
 (0.032) (0.053) (0.030)
Age −0.000 −0.004* −0.003***
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Age2 −0.000 0.000 0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leave −0.024 0.044 −0.062*
 (0.035) (0.066) (0.030)
Labour 0.076 0.195* 0.009
 (0.044) (0.088) (0.039)
Lib Dems 0.148 0.101 0.133
 (0.094) (0.115) (0.088)
UKIP −0.043 0.025 0.031
 (0.061) (0.113) (0.063)
Other 0.024 0.209 −0.032
 (0.078) (0.120) (0.066)
Did not vote 0.090 0.231* −0.017
 (0.061) (0.111) (0.053)
Constant 0.506*** 0.961*** 0.299***
 (0.072) (0.111) (0.061)
Observations 1784 1784 1784
R-squared 0.026 0.092 0.040
Log likelihood −1157.115 −1978.604 −894.468
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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expenses scandal of 2009. In this context, it is hardly surprising that elected representa-
tives value integrity highly at present. The question is: are citizens still so concerned with 
integrity, or have they moved on to another point of focus, such as authenticity?
Stoker (2017), reviewing the first hundred years of near-universal suffrage in Britain, 
argued that while class and then competence dominated political exchanges for most of 
the century, we have seen an emerging emphasis on a politics of resentment. This political 
style looks to blame others and identify enemies as a basis of garnering support. This shift 
is driven by economic change, social and geographical polarisation, and a cultural fram-
ing based on emphasising the gap between ‘metropolitan liberal elites’ and ‘the left 
behind’. In this view, many citizens in the current period are looking for authentic politi-
cians who understand their lives, concerns, and interests and will stand up for them. 
Politicians both within the mainstream and beyond have developed and exploited the 
politics of resentment, developing various versions of populist framings that place them 
on the side of the people against a failing elite. Indeed, as Joe Kennedy (2018) notes in no 
uncertain terms in his book Authentocrats, British politicians are by no means unaware of 
this desire for authentic politicians; whether their pursuit of it is genuine or not. For exam-
ple, we have heard Labour’s commitment to ‘the many, not the few’ while Boris Johnson 
and the Conservative Party framed the Brexit dilemma as the people against a ‘Remainer’ 
establishment. At the Conservative Party conference in 2016, then Prime Minister Theresa 
May contrasted the citizens of ‘nowhere’, who talk about being global citizens, against 
her preference for those citizens who share history, language and a common culture. A 
populist politics of resentment shifts the focus of citizens from competence and integrity 
to authenticity; speaking on behalf of ordinary people against the elite.
Turning to the second part of the authenticity gap – the gap between citizen expecta-
tions of authenticity and citizens’ apparent judgements of inauthenticity, which appear to 
Figure 7. Coefficient Plots From Regression Analyses of Personality Trait Scales on Political 
Distrust, Gender, Age, EU Referendum Vote and Party Vote in 2017.
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drive political distrust – this is consistent with our previous discussion of the drivers of 
political trust. Citizens make trust judgements using authenticity judgements as a short 
cut. Still, the question remains: why do citizens currently judge politicians to be 
inauthentic?
Here, the framework of demand, supply and intermediary factors is helpful (Hay, 
2007; Norris, 2011). On the demand side of politics, citizens are thought to have become 
more educated, more secure in economic terms, and less deferent to authority figures (e.g. 
Dalton, 1984; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart and Welzel, 2010; 
Norris, 1999). A part of this could be that citizens have come to expect politicians like 
themselves, as opposed to elites with superior knowledge and skills, and consequently, 
different lives, experiences and interests. Another demand-side factor of relevance may 
be what Sennett (1977) called ‘the ideology of intimacy’. For Sennett, as societies like 
Britain’s became more capitalist and secular, citizens traumatised by these changes with-
drew from public life and increasingly focused on personality and self. They increasingly 
expected rewards of warmth, trust and open expression of feeling from all experiences. 
They progressively expected more authenticity from political engagement.
In terms of intermediary factors, it is thought that changes in the media sector (dereg-
ulation, new providers, increased competition) led to changes in media coverage of poli-
tics (shorter stories, more focus on partisan conflict and institutional failure, more 
opinion and instant reaction). These changes in turn led to changes in political commu-
nication (more stage-managed soundbites and photo opportunities), which in turn led to 
citizens feeling distanced from politicians (Clarke et al., 2018). Another intermediary 
factor of relevance here is what Hoggart (1957) called ‘democratic egalitarianism’. He 
studied the uses of mass literacy by popular newspapers and magazines in 1950s Britain 
and found that such publications would flatter their customers by depicting ‘the common 
man’ or ‘the little man’ as a hero. Hoggart foresaw that citizens would gradually come to 
compare politicians to this heroic figure and find most politicians to be lacking in ‘the 
common touch’.
Why should politicians be found lacking in this regard? Here, supply-side factors 
help to complete the picture. The concept of an emerging political class is a core idea 
as the tasks of government have got more demanding and complex (Borchert and Zeiss, 
2003). The state has expanded and modernised, political occupations have been profes-
sionalised and financial rewards for politicians have been introduced and improved 
over time (pensions, allowances, salaries). Career opportunities for politicians have 
expanded, now including positions on parliamentary select committees, as elected may-
ors, in quangos, and in the devolved administrations. These developments are thought 
to have led to the decline of the amateur politician, who could be an aristocrat but could 
equally be a union shop steward, and the rise of the ‘professional’ or ‘career’ politician, 
who is commonly university-educated, middle class, and seemingly part of a homoge-
neous political class.
This concept of ‘the political class’ is an important one. Whether such a class exists 
from the perspective of data on occupational backgrounds or class consciousness among 
politicians, journalists, lobbyists and so on is open to debate. However, we follow Allen 
(2018) in thinking that what matters most is the clear existence of a narrative of the 
political class. This narrative is made up of three claims: (1) political elites all come 
from similar backgrounds (the claim of characteristic homogeneity), (2) political elites 
all think the same (attitudinal homogeneity) and (3) political elites all act the same 
(behavioural homogeneity). The key message for the present argument is that members 
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of the political class are imagined to be similar to each other and different from ordinary 
people. This might explain why they are thought to be inauthentic and therefore 
untrustworthy.
Finally, it is the social background of politicians that links the two parts of the authen-
ticity gap explored in this article. Many citizens perceive politicians to be out of touch 
with ordinary people; to lack understanding of their everyday lives and struggles. These 
citizens distrust what they perceive to be inauthentic politicians. At the same time, few 
politicians appear to recognise the importance of authenticity to British politics at the 
present moment. Sharing social backgrounds and political styles with their colleagues, 
they take the authenticity of politicians for granted. Why would they not? The problem is 
that many citizens value authenticity, perceive a lack of authenticity, and may come to 
perceive a failure on the part of politicians to even recognise the issue of authenticity.
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Notes
1. Robustness tests using raw alpha-scales yielded the same substantive results as reported here.
2. Including those two variables in the scales produces statistical relationships that are substantively the same 
and significant but weaker.
3. The confidence measure is an average of 11 scales for confidence in the UK government to deal with 
various issues, while the other trust measures have been recoded into a binary variable where 1 = distrust. 
The distrust scale is then composed of all of these measures, weighted by their loading unto their common 
underlying factor.
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